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EVIDENCE ON THE INSURANCE EFFECT OF REDISTRIBUTIVE TAXATION
Charles Grant, Christos Koulovatianos, Alexander Michaelides, and Mario Padula*
Abstract—If households face uninsurable idiosyncratic earnings risk, theory
predicts that redistributive tax and transfer systems have both an insurance
and a distortionary effect. Exploiting the substantial variation of tax and
transfer systems across U.S. states and over time, we investigate the nec-
essary traces of these two effects in the data: that state-level measures of
redistributive taxation should correlate negatively with the standard devi-
ation and the mean of the within-state consumption distribution. We find
that the first correlation is robust, supporting strongly the presence of an
insurance effect. The distortionary effect can also be detected in the data,
but it is less precisely estimated.
I. Introduction
MUCH analysis of household consumption focuses onthe study of choices made by forward-looking wealth-
accumulating agents who face undiversifiable idiosyncratic
labor income shocks and liquidity constraints.1 Incorporat-
ing this partial-equilibrium consumer problem into workable
simulation and calibration models of the macroeconomy that
explicitly allow heterogenous agents has become standard
ever since the pioneering work by Bewley (1986), Huggett
(1993), and Aiyagari (1994). Critical policy issues arise from
the inclusion of idiosyncratic risk. In these macromodels of
uninsurable idiosyncratic risk, markets are incomplete, and
agents face the probability of not being able to smooth con-
sumption through borrowing. Hence distortionary income
taxes might improve aggregate welfare, because such taxes
directly compress the spread of uncorrelated idiosyncratic
income shocks a priori. In other words, marginal income
taxes may have an insurance effect by decreasing the effective
fluctuations of after-tax individual income, a point also made
in earlier work by Mirrlees (1974) and Varian (1980). Con-
sistent with these ideas, Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2008)
calibrate a heterogeneous agent model with idiosyncratic risk
and find that optimal marginal income tax rates are positive
and sizable.
In any idiosyncratic earnings risk model where consumer
goods are normal, with or without labor or savings distortions,
the insurance effect of redistributive taxation would imply
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1 For example, Deaton (1991); Carroll (1997); Hubbard, Skinner, and
Zeldes (1995); and Gourinchas and Parker (2002) offer supporting evidence
that some combination of precautionary saving or liquidity constraints can
be important determinants of saving and consumption dynamics.
that higher taxes and transfers decrease the standard devia-
tion of consumption across households.2 However, average
consumption may be lower due to reduced incentives for cap-
ital accumulation or labor supply. The traditional approach
without idiosyncratic risk has emphasized the distortionary
effect of taxes—the reduction in average consumption that
decreases welfare. The more recent literature, in which agents
face uninsured idiosyncratic risk, demonstrates the insurance
effect of redistributive taxes, a reduction in each household’s
consumption variability that may raise welfare.3 The relative
importance of these two effects is crucial when evaluating
the welfare effects of fiscal policy. Nevertheless, assessing
whether the distortionary and insurance effects of redistri-
bution through the tax and benefit system can indeed be
observed in the data remains an open question. Testing for
the presence of these effects is therefore the aim of this study.
We examine the empirical evidence on the effect of taxes
and transfers on the mean and the standard deviation of con-
sumption across households in order to investigate the traces
of the distortionary and the insurance effect in consumption.
Demonstrating empirically these effects, however, is not a
trivial task: it requires using household data to construct mea-
sures of the tax system and the distribution of consumption.
One possibility is to investigate households in different coun-
tries. However, we believe that cross-country variation in the
key variables may reflect differences in institutional, cultural,
and other country-specific features, as well as differences
in the measurement of the appropriate household level vari-
ables in different national surveys. Moreover, the design of
these household surveys differs substantially among coun-
tries, making it difficult to construct consistent measures of
consumption and of the tax system across countries.
Rather than using differences across countries, we exploit
differences across U.S. states and over time to investigate
the relationship within each state between consumption and
the tax system. The difficulties highlighted above are likely
to be much less important for U.S. states since, in measuring
taxes or consumption, the same survey can be exploited for all
households in the sample. Using the same survey across tax
regimes reduces the chance that differences in survey design
spuriously generate the different measured policy responses.
However, there are two obvious disadvantages. First, rela-
tively few households will be used in each state in measuring
the tax system or the distribution of consumption for that
state; hence, such state-level measures are likely to be con-
taminated by measurement error. Second, households find it
easier to move between U.S. states than between countries.
2 A transfer system is not necessary for higher marginal taxation to gener-
ate a more compressed distribution. Elmendorf and Kimball (2000) show in
a partial equilibrium model how realistic increases in labor income marginal
tax rates can cause large reductions in after-tax labor income risk.
3 Floden (2001) provides a clear evaluation of the welfare effects showing
the trade-off between distortions and insurance.
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Both problems are likely to make it more difficult to demon-
strate the effects of redistributive taxes on the distribution of
consumption. Nevertheless, using data on U.S. states has a
major advantage in that it allows us to exploit the surpris-
ingly large variation in tax regimes between states and over
time. This makes the United States an appropriate laboratory
in which to test the effect of taxes on consumption.
Our empirical investigation necessitates constructing mea-
sures of consumption and of taxes for different states. For
consumption, we use 24 years from the American Consumer
Expenditure Survey (CEX). The data allow us to compute
the mean and the standard deviation of log nondurable con-
sumption by year and state. To construct the tax measures,
we first collect household income data from the Current Pop-
ulation Survey (CPS) and then use the TAXSIM model. This
program, provided by the NBER, takes inputs about each
household’s income and other characteristics to construct
the state and the federal tax liability, as well as the mar-
ginal tax rates, of each household in the data (full details
on the TAXSIM model can be found in Feenberg & Coutts,
1993). From the TAXSIM output, we construct two different
measures of the tax system in each state. One is the mean
marginal tax rate across households in each state and each
year. However, this measure of taxes has serious drawbacks
as a measure of redistributiveness: it ignores tax progressivity
as well as transfers. We therefore also construct a measure of
tax redistribution that reflects the compression of the income
distribution induced by both taxes and transfers. We report
results for both measures of the tax system, although, as
will be discussed further below, we prefer the measure of
redistributive taxation.
The empirical exercise investigates the relationship
between redistributive taxation and consumption. We find
evidence that more redistributive taxes are negatively cor-
related with the standard deviation of (log) nondurable
consumption. The conclusions are robust to unobserved het-
erogeneity at the state level and to expanding the specification
to include variables that vary both across states and over
time, such as the state unemployment rate. The results are
unchanged when we address the possible endogeneity of our
tax measure by using appropriate instruments. We therefore
find evidence supporting the presence of an insurance effect
of redistributive taxation in the United States.
Our results also suggest evidence for the distortionary
effect of higher taxes, although the negative correlation of
redistributive taxes with state-level mean consumption is not
as robust as the correlation concerning the insurance effect.
Nevertheless, after controlling for state effects, the results are
always significant when using the mean marginal tax rate and
the income compression measure of taxes if the tax system
is appropriately instrumented. Demonstrating the insurance
effect means it is important to stress the appropriate policy
trade-offs (between the distortionary and insurance effects)
in models of taxes that incorporate idiosyncratic risk.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section II, we
describe the data and compare the tax system in different U.S.
states. We present the empirical findings and provide robust-
ness checks in section III, and make concluding remarks in
section IV.
II. Data
Our empirical exercise exploits cross-state differences in
the evolution of state taxation and its relationship to the dis-
tribution of consumption. To proceed, we need to measure
the mean and standard deviation of household consump-
tion within each state and each year, and also to measure
tax redistributiveness for those states. In turn, this requires
measuring each household’s consumption, income, and taxes
using household-level data. To construct a reasonably homo-
geneous sample of households across the different states, we
select prime-age households (where the head is between the
ages of 30 and 60) and exclude self-employed and farming
households.
A. Consumption
We use CEX data from 1982 to 2005 to measure house-
hold nondurable consumption. The CEX is a household-level
survey run on a yearly basis by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics (BLS) for computing the weights for the American
Consumer Price Index. The CEX has detailed information
on individual expenditure items, as well as on a variety of
household characteristics (including state of residence). This
allows us to construct a measure of nondurable consump-
tion that includes food and beverages, tobacco, housekeeping
services, fuel, public utilities, repairs, public transport, per-
sonal care, entertainment, clothing, and books. Households
are interviewed four times and report their expenditures in the
three months before the interview month. To minimize the
recall error, we keep only the expenditure for the month clos-
est to the interview month. More details on the CEX survey
can be found in Attanasio, Battistin, and Ichimura (2005).4
We restrict the sample to households for which full state infor-
mation is available.5 In order to keep the sampling error low,
we include only the 22 largest states—those states with, on
average, 80 observations per year.
Consumption is deflated by the (region-specific) CPI in
order to convert nominal values into real ones. Finally, to con-
trol for cross-state differences in demographic composition,
we regress nondurable consumption on a cubic polynomial
in age, education, family size, race, and marital status and
construct group averages from the residuals.
4 However, see the Online Appendix, available at http://www.mitpress
journals.org/doi/suppl/10.1162/REST_a_00040, for regression analysis
that includes all three months to which the interview refers, showing the
results are broadly similar if that specification is used instead.
5 By comparing the sample for which we have state information with
the sample for which we do not have state information, we find that the
share of male household heads in the missing state information sample is
comparable to that in the nonmissing information sample (71 versus 70
percent). Moreover, in both subsamples, the average age is 47.5, the family
size 2.5 persons, and the number of children 0.7.
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Table 1.—Wages and Transfers for U.S. Households, 1982–2005
Average If
Average Received % Receive
Wages $30,350 $32,922 92.2
Social security 289 5,303 5.9
Supplementary security income 81 3,210 3.0
Public assistance, welfare 107 2,916 4.2
Unemployment, workers’
compensation 275 2,491 11.5
Food stamps 71 1,128 6.8
Total transfer 833 3,771 22.2
Data are constructed from reported responses in the March supplement of the CPS for the years
1982–2005. Total transfer refers to the sum of social security benefits, supplementary security benefits,
unemployment or workers’ compensation, welfare or other public assistance, and food stamps. The CPS
questionnaire conflates social security benefits with railroad retirement income and worker’s compensation
with veterans’ payments. All values are in 1984 real dollars.
B. Income and Transfers
To measure how much redistribution there is through the
tax system, household-level information on both income and
transfers is required. This information is obtained from the
March supplement of the CPS. This survey, also run by the
BLS, is designed to give detailed and accurate information on
income and demographics. Using income (and transfer) data
from the CPS has several advantages. First, the survey asks
much more detailed questions on income than does the CEX.
Second, more households are surveyed, making state-level
averages more accurate. Third, in the regressions, we will
have consumption measures on the left-hand side and income
and tax measures on the right-hand side: taking the income
and consumption measures from different surveys ensures
that measurement errors in these variables are uncorrelated.
Using the CPS, we construct total household labor income
and transfer income, which includes social security and
railroad retirement income, supplementary security income,
unemployment compensation, worker’s compensation and
veterans’ payments, public assistance or welfare, and the
value of food stamps received.6 The data, summarized in
table 1, show that the average transfer over the whole sampled
population of non-self-employed, nonfarming prime-age
households amounts to $883. Moreover, 22.2% of house-
holds receive some sort of transfer. Conditional on receiving
at least something, households receive an average of $3,771.
This should be compared to the average household salary
in the survey of $30,350, or $14,916 for households that are
receiving transfers. While this amount may seem small, it can
make a substantial difference to some households’ after-tax
(and transfer) income.
C. Household Taxes
U.S. households pay taxes on earned and unearned income,
as well as sales and property taxes. We concentrate on income
taxes, which are raised at both the state and the federal lev-
els, and exclude sales and property taxes. Sales taxes are paid
6 While there is some evidence that unearned income is underreported
in the CPS (see Ruser, Pilot, & Nelson, 2004), we believe this problem is
unlikely to seriously distort the results in this study since it is likely to affect
residents in all states equally.
at the place of sale rather than residence, making it difficult
to measure the sales taxes levied on households within the
state if cross-border shopping takes place. In the CEX, the
spending figure excludes sales taxes, so that expenditure is
comparable across states. Property taxes are largely levied at
the county, school board, or city level. Therefore, the prop-
erty tax legislation may be very diverse within each state
depending on the locality where the households reside.
Constructing a single measure of tax redistributiveness in
each state is not trivial and entails addressing a number of
problems.7 Income tax systems can be complicated since not
only do different households face different tax rates, but there
is also considerable variation in tax rates across jurisdictions.
The first column of table 2 shows the lowest and the highest
federal tax brackets for 2003, a representative year near the
end of our sample period. The federal marginal tax rate varies
nonlinearly from 10% for single people whose annual income
is less than $7,000 ($14,000 for married couples filing jointly)
up to 35% for incomes over $311,950, with additional tax
brackets of 15%, 25%, 28%, and 33% for single filers whose
annual income is under $28,400, $68,800, and $143,500 (with
higher bracket limits for household heads and couples filing
jointly). These tax rates and tax brackets have all changed
over the years. Before 1987 a much larger number of tax
brackets was applicable, and before 1996, around 15% to
20% of people had incomes that were not sufficiently high
for them to pay any federal income tax.
In an early paper, Feenberg and Rosen (1987) document
the large variation of tax regimes across states for 1977 to
1983. They show that in 1983, in all but four states there was
no federal deduction for state income taxes paid, while in fif-
teen states the deduction for federal income taxes paid was
allowed (in seven states within a limit). In fifteen states, cou-
ples and individuals had different schedules, and in seventeen
income splitting was allowed.
The remaining rows of table 2 describe the variation in state
tax rates in 2003 and demonstrate the large differences in state
marginal tax rates and exemptions in different states. It shows
that several states, including Texas, Florida, and Washington,
do not levy any income taxes on their residents. The other
states have a variety of income tax bands and exemptions (or
tax credits) that are applicable. Although some states, such
as Massachusetts and Illinois, have a flat-rate income tax, the
marginal tax rate increases with income in most states. The
difference between the highest and lowest marginal tax rate
can sometimes be large. In Ohio the lowest marginal tax rate
is 0.743% and the highest is 7.5%, while several states have
marginal tax rates even higher for the highest-earning house-
holds. There are also typically a variety of tax allowances to
which households are entitled. While there is no tax-exempt
income in Pennsylvania, up to $8,800 of income is exempt
7 We deliberately use the term redistributive rather than progressive as
progressiveness is most often used to describe a tax system in which the
marginal tax rate increases with income (or wealth). For example, a tax rate
of 100%, with lump-sum transfers, is not progressive, although it is highly
redistributive.
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Table 2.—Federal and Selected State Income Tax Rates
2003 Tax Rates Exemptions
State Minimum Maximum Single Married Dependents Mean Tax Rate Tax Redistribution
Federal 10 35
Alaskaa 18.9 22.8
Arizona 2.87 5.04 $2,100 $4,200 2,300 22.3 30.0
California 1.0 9.3 80b 160b 251b 23.6 33.9
Colorado 4.63 4.63 None 25.1 30.7
Floridaa 18.3 25.9
Georgia 1.0 6.0 2,700 5,400 2,700 23.8 31.5
Illinois 3.0 3.0 2,000 4,000 2,000 22.7 29.6
Indiana 3.4 3.4 1,000 2,000 1,000 22.1 28.2
Maryland 2.0 4.75 2,400 4,800 2,400 26.9 32.8
Massachusetts 5.0 5.0 4,400 8,800 1,000 24.9 33.3
Michigan 4.0 4.0 3,000 6,000 3,000 23.8 31.4
Minnesota 5.35 7.85 3,000 6,000 3,000 27.4 34.4
Missouri 1.5 6.0 2,100 4,200 2,100 22.9 30.0
New Jersey 1.4 6.37 1,000 2,000 1,500 24.3 32.1
New York 4.0 6.85 — — 1,000 22.9 34.8
Ohio 0.743 7.5 1,200 2,400 1,200 22.9 30.7
Oregon 5.0 9.0 145b 290b 145b 25.9 32.8
Pennsylvania 2.8 2.8 None 21.2 29.0
Texasa 18.2 26.6
Virginia 2.0 5.75 800 1,600 800 25.8 31.3
Washingtona 20.0 24.9
Wisconsin 4.6 6.75 700 1,400 400 27.0 33.0
The federal and state taxes are for 2003. The data on federal taxes are available from the Internal Revenue Service, U.S. Department of Treasury. The data on state taxes are available from the Federation of Tax
Administrators, Washington DC. “Minimum” and “maximum” refer to the minimum and maximum tax brackets in the state; “single” and “married” refer to single filers and households in which the husband and wife
jointly file, while “dependents” refers to each additional dependent person for which the file may claim. The last two columns report the mean marginal tax rate and the tax redistribution measure for each state for the
entire sample period, constructed using income from the March supplement of the CPS for 1982–2005, and using taxes reported from the NBER TAXSIM program. “Mean tax rate” refers to the mean marginal tax rate
across households, while “income compression” refers to 1 minus the ratio of the standard deviation of income after taxes (and transfers) to the standard deviation of income before taxes.
aNo state income tax.
bRefers to tax credits rather than exempt income.
from state income tax in Massachusetts for married couples,
but only $1,000 for each dependent—in contrast to Min-
nesota, which allows the same exempt level of income for
the earner, the earner’s partner, and each dependent.
To construct each household’s income tax burden, we
exploit the TAXSIM 8.0 program developed by Feenberg
(see Feenberg & Coutts, 1993, for details) and provided by
the NBER. Using a variety of household variables taken from
the CPS, including the husband’s and wife’s earnings, inter-
est, dividends and other income, and information about the
household’s characteristics (such as the number of depen-
dent children) and other deductibles (like property costs), as
well as the year and state of residence, the program calcu-
lates the household’s state and the federal tax liability, and
the marginal tax rates, explicitly controlling for a variety of
allowances. The output of the TAXSIM program allows us
to measure how redistributive the tax system is in each state.
D. Measuring Tax Redistributiveness
No completely satisfactory measure of redistributiveness
exists, but given the output provided by the TAXSIM pro-
gram, several measures are possible. Rather than explicitly
model all the different effective marginal tax rates (and trans-
fers) that are available, we instead reduce the problem to
constructing an index that summarizes the tax system in each
state. One obvious measure is to compute the average mar-
ginal tax rate across households within each time period t
and state j. This is calculated as the mean of the household
marginal (federal and state) tax rates obtained from the
TAXSIM program. The second-to-last column of table 2
reports the average over the entire sample period of this tax
measure for each of the states in our sample. The mean mar-
ginal tax rate for the whole of the United States (taking federal
and state taxes together) is 23.3%, but the differences across
states are surprisingly large. The mean marginal tax rate in
Texas and Florida, where there is no state income tax, is just
over 18%, but it is around 27% in Maryland and in Wiscon-
sin. That is, taxes in the latter two states are 50% higher than
in Florida.
The mean marginal tax rate, however, accounts for neither
transfers nor heterogeneity among household tax rates. As we
saw earlier, marginal taxes differ substantially across agents
even within the same year and state. Furthermore, agents
have many exemptions, allowances, and transfers available to
them that depend on their household characteristics. Hence,
the mean marginal tax rate does not adequately capture the
progressivity of the tax system. For example, a mean marginal
tax rate of 20% in a state could be due to all households
paying a marginal tax rate of 20%, or to the bottom fifth of
the population paying 100% and the rest nothing, or to the
top 20% paying 100% and the rest nothing. These three cases
have substantially different implications for redistribution.
To address these concerns about using the mean mar-
ginal tax rate, we also construct a more direct measure
of how much the tax system compresses or redistributes
income, which explicitly accounts for transfers and for the
fact that the marginal tax rate differs across households. This
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measure is similar to measures of government redistribution
used by Attanasio and Ríos-Rull (2000) and Krueger and
Perri (2006). This income compression measure is defined as
1 − sdjt(incomeijt − tax liabilityijt + transfersijt)
sdjt(incomeijt)
, (1)
where the tax liability is obtained from the TAXSIM program
and i denotes the household. This measure is computed for
households that reside in a given state j in a given time period
t as 1 minus the ratio of the standard deviation of income
after tax and transfers to the standard deviation of income
before tax and transfers.8 Given that the mean marginal tax
rate conceals large differences in households’ marginal tax
rates, the income compression measure will be our preferred
measure of redistribution through the tax system. Moreover,
it includes transfers that are ignored when measuring the tax
system using the mean marginal tax rate.
The last column of table 2 reports the income compres-
sion measure of taxes for each of the states in our sample.
The income compression measure of taxes varies substan-
tially across the United States, as does the mean marginal tax
rate. However, the income compression measure is consis-
tently higher since it accounts transfers and tax progressivity.
Nevertheless, the rank ordering of states is similar (the cor-
relation between the two measures is 0.74). The lowest value
in the continental United States for the income compression
measure of taxes and transfers is in Washington at 24.9%,
while the highest value, at 34.8%, is in New York (tradition-
ally viewed as one of the states with the most progressive
taxation). That is, the tax and transfer system is 50% more
redistributive in New York than in, for example, Florida. Tak-
ing both tax measures, the numbers in table 2 show that there
is enough variation across states to get meaningful results,
a key issue if we are to convincingly assess the theoretical
predictions, and results are reported for both measures.
III. The Empirical Evidence
The substantial variation of tax regimes across U.S. states
and over time allows us to show how the two measures
of taxes are related to the mean and standard deviation of
real nondurable log consumption (referred throughout as the
mean and standard deviation of consumption). To control for
observed heterogeneity at the household level, the following
procedure was adopted: in the first stage, household con-
sumption was regressed against a cubic polynomial in age,
8 Using variances instead of standard deviations in equation (1) can allow
the decomposition of the variance of after-tax income into the variance
of gross income, the variance of taxes, and the covariance between the
two. However, we prefer the standard deviation measure in order to satisfy
certain desirable requirements. For example, if everyone faces the same
flat marginal tax rate with no allowances, it is plausible to require that the
resulting measure be equal to this common marginal rate. Using the variance
would violate this requirement.
Figure 1.—Nondurable Consumption and Redistributive Taxation
education, family size, month, year, race, and marital status.
Group averages were then constructed from the residuals.9
Included in the regression are the 22 states for which we
had the most household observations. In choosing the cell
size (the number of different household observations in each
state-year cell), we face a trade-off: choosing a higher number
of households in each cell implies fewer observations in the
regression, which leads to higher standard errors; in contrast,
a smaller cell size generates a larger number of observations
in the regression but increases the within-cell sampling error.
Either problem makes it more difficult to find a significant
result in the regressions. We choose a minimum average cell
size of eighty household observations for each state each
period. This choice means that 22 states are included in the
regressions and seems a reasonable compromise, given that
there are few observations for many states.
Figure 1 presents a plot of the raw data of our measure
of redistributive taxes and consumption. The upper panel
plots the income compression measure of taxes rate against
the standard deviation of consumption, the lower against the
9 Omitting these first-stage controls does not substantially change the
results.
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mean of consumption, with the results reported in column 1
of tables 3 and 4. The figures look similar when using the
mean marginal tax measure (those results are reported in col-
umn 5 of tables 3 and 4). In both cases, we have also fitted
a regression line through the observations, but while down-
ward sloping, neither slope is significant. The effect on the
standard deviation is, however, significant if taxes are mea-
sured using the mean marginal tax rate or (as is discussed in
the online appendix, available at http://www.mitpressjournals
.org/doi/suppl/10.1162/REST_a_00040) the consumption
data are trimmed.
The simple regressions shown in figure 1 neglect a number
of issues. First, there could be systematic differences across
states that obscure or amplify the effects of taxes on con-
sumption. Such differences might depend on differences in
the population composition across states and might not be
orthogonal to the marginal tax rates. Second, business cycle
effects jointly affect income and consumption and therefore
have the potential to lie behind the association between taxes
and the moments of consumption. Third, state-specific time-
varying income risks might affect either the level or the
dispersion of consumption. To the extent that tax variables
proxy for these risks, one may find a negative association
between consumption dispersion and taxes, which may be
unrelated to the insurance effect of taxation. Fourth, taxes
and consumption might be jointly determined, and therefore
our estimates could be affected by a standard endogene-
ity problem. Therefore, we devote the rest of the paper to
understanding how robust the relation is between taxes and
consumption.10
A. The Insurance Effect of the Tax System
Table 3 shows the regressions using the standard deviation
of log consumption as the dependent variable. The first five
columns report the results when the tax system is measured
using our preferred income compression measure, and the
last five columns use the mean marginal tax rate. A negative
relationship between the tax system and the standard devi-
ation of log consumption when using raw data may partly
reflect the fact that many factors affect the level of wealth or
taxes in an economy that are unrelated to taxes. To control
for this, we include state dummies in all regressions. This
removes any fixed differences across states. Columns 2 and
7 report the results for the simplest specification that account
for state effects. The coefficients are negative and are also
statistically significant at the 5% and 1% level.
A further concern with these regressions is that taxes and
transfers, and income or consumption shocks, may be co-
determined. For example, a positive productivity or income
10 We also undertake further robustness checks in the online appen-
dix available at http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/suppl/10.1162/REST_
a_00040, which investigates the effect of trimming the data of low-
consumption households (since taking logs could make the data sensitive
to low outliers) and using all three months to which each interview in the
CEX refers rather than just the month closest to the interview month. We
thank two anonymous referees for recommending these checks.
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shock to the state is likely to affect the state’s budget (and
hence tax requirements) as well as households’ levels of
gross income and consumption in the state. Alternatively, the
observed differences across states might come from unob-
servable heterogeneity in preferences or household attributes
at the household level. Other differences may arise from
cross-state variation in the underlying idiosyncratic com-
ponent of the income process at the household level (for
example, if social security contributions and benefits are
related to household features or employment histories).
Sampling households whose heads are aged between 30
and 60 helps to control for many of the potential problems
due to heterogeneity in personal attributes at the house-
hold level, as does the inclusion of state dummies. However,
potential endogeneity problems could still occur. To address
these potential problems, we rely on two different sets of
instrumental variables that predict the extent of redistribu-
tion through taxes and transfers but do not affect current
consumption insurance directly. Our first set of instruments
includes lagged values of the redistribution measures. How-
ever, it would also be useful to look at a measure of the
expected tax system where the expectation depends on the
effectiveness of the state administration in raising tax revenue
and the likely taste for redistribution of the local residents in
the state. We accomplish this by instrumenting the tax system
with a set of lagged political variables, and two additional
variables: a measure of the tax-raising ability, or tax fiscal
capacity of the state in each period and a measure of the
tax intensity or effort in each period. We will call the whole
instrument set political variables.
For the years up to 1991, data on tax efficiency are available
from ACIR (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations, 1993); data for the subsequent years are taken
from Tannenwald (2002) and Tannenwald and Turner (2004),
although it was necessary to linearly interpolate the series for
some years. More details on these measures are available in
Tannenwald (2002). To these two measures we add a set of
instruments containing political variables, like the political
affiliation of the state governor and the state legislature and
the proportion of voters in a state voting Democratic rather
than Republican in presidential elections.11 Political vari-
ables are candidate instruments since they are likely to reflect
attitudes toward redistribution, rather than general economic
conditions.
Columns 3 and 8 of table 3 investigate the effect of using
the political variables, while columns 4 and 9 use the lagged
taxes as instruments. For both tax measures and both instru-
ment sets, the rank test is significant. Moreover, the Sargan
test does not reject the overidentifying restrictions for the
income compression measure (column 3) or the mean mar-
ginal tax rate measure (column 8). Combining the rank and
Sargan tests suggests that the political variables are suitable
instruments for a regression of the tax measure on mean
11 The data were made available by Tim Storey at the National Conference
of State Legislatures.
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consumption. The results show that the effect is not only
negative for both measures of the tax system, but also signif-
icant at the 1% level for the income compression measure of
taxes and at the 5% level for the mean marginal tax rate for
both instrument sets. When lagged taxes (columns 4 and 9)
are used, the coefficients are significant at the 1% level for
both tax measures.
As a further test of the theory, we include the state-specific
business cycle effects with the state unemployment rate in our
regression in columns 5 and 10, instrumented by its lag. Busi-
ness cycle effects might be state specific and come in the form
of time-varying income risk, which affects the consumption
distribution. By the same token, such effects might also be
correlated with our tax measures. Therefore, our results may
stem from not controlling for those effects. The coefficients
remain significant at the 5% level in column 5, and at the 1%
level in column 10. Moreover, these regressions suggest that
as much as a quarter of the difference in inequality between
states can be explained by differences in how redistributive
the tax system is (that is, the estimated coefficient in the sec-
ond column would account for a quarter of the difference in
equality between the most and the least redistributitive state).
Overall the results suggest that making the tax system
more redistributive substantially reduces the standard devi-
ation of consumption, or cross-sectional variability, as we
would expect. The evidence presented here points toward a
negative relation between taxes and consumption inequality.
This finding supports the premise that tax systems provide
insurance to households.
B. The Distortionary Effect of the Tax System
If the tax system has a distortionary effect, then one would
expect to observe a negative correlation between taxes and
mean consumption. As already stated, the basic regression
with no controls, corresponding to figure 1 and reported in the
first column of table 4, does not uncover a statistically signif-
icant relationship between mean consumption and the mean
marginal tax rate. However, as was argued for the standard
deviation of consumption results, it is important to account
for various types of endogeneity that might affect this con-
clusion. This analysis is reported in the remaining columns
of table 4.
To account for the cross-state differences in the compo-
sition of population within each state and for the effect of
unobservable variables that might be correlated with taxes,
we include state dummies in all regressions of table 4. The
results for the simple specification containing state dummies
show that the mean marginal tax rate is now negatively related
to mean consumption (column 7), but the redistributiveness
measure is not (column 2), suggesting, nevertheless, that a
statistically significant negative correlation may be in the
data.
We address the endogeneity of the tax variables by instru-
menting, as we did for the standard deviation of consumption
regressions. For both tax measures, the effect of taxes on
mean consumption is large and statistically significant when
we instrument with the political variables (columns 3 and 8),
and the Sargan test is passed. Similarly significant results are
obtained when instrumenting with lagged taxes (columns 4
and 9). When including the state unemployment rate in
the regression, only the negative correlation between the
mean marginal tax rate and mean consumption is preserved
(column 10). The correlation between the redistributive-
ness measure and mean consumption becomes statistically
insignificant in this specification (column 5).
Overall, the results using the mean marginal tax rate in
table 4 support the hypothesis that a more redistributive tax
system is associated with lower average consumption. How-
ever, the results using the income compression measure are
less convincing (in two cases, they are not significant at the
10% level). The evidence thus suggests that the correlation
between mean consumption and taxes is negative, though the
extent of such correlation and its precision depend on the
particular measure of taxes used.
Our results thus confirm how difficult it is to document the
distortionary effect of taxes and are consistent with the litera-
ture that has tried to estimate the elasticity of taxable income
with respect to the marginal tax rate. This line of research, ini-
tiated by studies such as Lindsey (1987) and Feldstein (1995),
has shown how difficult it is to find empirically a distor-
tionary effect from higher taxation. This inconclusiveness is
also similar to more recent findings such as Backus, Henrik-
sen, and Storesletten (2008), who focus on the effect of taxes
on global capital allocation and find mixed evidence on the
relation between taxes and capital. It seems that investigating
the empirical robustness of the theoretically plausible distor-
tionary effect of taxes on consumption is an open question
for further future research.
IV. Conclusion
When consumers face uninsurable, idiosyncratic income
risk, redistributive taxes have two countervailing effects:
an insurance and a distortionary effect. The first effect is
captured by a negative relationship between taxes and con-
sumption dispersion across households. The second effect is
shown by a negative relationship between taxes and mean
consumption. Hitherto, however, there has been little empir-
ical research into whether we can observe either of these
effects in the data, which is perhaps surprising given the
prominence and vehemence with which they have been dis-
cussed. This may partly be explained by the difficulty in
devising an appropriate test. We address this issue by investi-
gating the differences in the mean and standard deviation of
log nondurable consumption when the redistributiveness of
the tax system varies using household-level data. We take
data for income and for consumption from different data
sources to eliminate spurious correlation in the state-level tax
and consumption measures. Finally, constructing a measure
of the redistributiveness of the tax system requires that we
account for the fact that households receive transfers and pay
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different effective tax rates. We construct an income com-
pression measure to address these concerns.
The U.S. states provide a suitable laboratory since, perhaps
surprisingly, these states vary substantially in the degree to
which their tax and benefit systems are redistributive. We find
strong supportive evidence for the presence of the insurance
effect, as there is a negative correlation between redistributive
taxes and the standard deviation of log nondurable consump-
tion. We show that our results are not affected by unobserved
heterogeneity at the state level or, for the most part, to
nationwide and state-specific business cycle effects. More-
over, accounting for the potential endogeneity of taxes by
using appropriate instrumental variables does not alter our
conclusions. The negative correlation between redistributive
taxes and within-state mean consumption is less resistant to
the same robustness checks. However, our results lend sup-
port to the empirical relevance of the distortionary effect of
redistributive taxation.
In summary, we find strong evidence for the insurance
effect of redistributiveness through the taxation system and
milder evidence for the distortionary effect of taxation. Taken
together, we interpret our findings to suggest that these
channels are an empirically relevant consideration for pol-
icy analysis. Models with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk, for
instance, Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998), Floden (2001),
Domeij and Heathcote (2004), and Conesa et al. (2008), thus
stress an important issue in the evaluation of policies financed
through marginal income taxes.
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